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This article studies the effects of informal, non-monetary sanctions, such as warnings, 
which are often used as an enforcement instrument by environmental inspection agencies. 
In cases of uncertainty with respect to the measured emissions due to measurement errors 
or accidental violations, some firms are unjustly penalised. As warnings provide a buffer 
period in which the firm is informed about the violation without any monetary 
consequences, it will be theoretically shown that warnings can help to reduce the welfare 
cost of such type II-errors and reduce the overdeterrence of low-cost firms - albeit at the 
cost of underdeterring medium-cost firms.  
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1. Introduction 
Firms that are subject to environmental regulations are induced by the regulator to comply 
through inspections and sanctions. These sanctions can be formal or informal, monetary or 
non-monetary. The economic literature
2 on the deterrence of crime, which started with 
Becker (1968), has focussed mainly on formal, monetary sanctions, and more specifically 
on fines. When non-monetary sanctions are studied in the literature, authors typically 
discuss prison sentences (e.g. Shavell, 1987 and Garoupa and Klerman, 2004). Informal, 
non-monetary sanctions, such as warnings and advices, are only rarely studied. Warnings 
are, nonetheless, often used as an enforcement instrument by the environmental inspection 
agency to instruct firms to end any situation of non-compliance and abide with all 
appropriate laws, decrees and permits. For example, Rousseau (2005) describes the 
enforcement actions taken after Flemish textile companies were found in violation during 
an inspection. In the majority of the cases (72 %) no action was taken. However, if an 
enforcement action was taken, a warning was given to the violator in 89 percent of the 
cases. This warning was either the only instrument used (19 %) or accompanied by a 
notice of violation (70 %). 
A recent study focusing on warnings is Nyborg and Telle (2004), which investigates the 
potential of warnings to help regulators keep control. Using a game theoretic approach, 
Nyborg and Telle argue that ‘warnings reduce substantially the probability of (…) 
accidental switches from the full-compliance to the no-compliance equilibrium’. A more 
empirical approach is taken by Eckert (2004), who shows that warnings are used by the 
Canadian inspection agency to target firms for inspection, with past warnings increasing 
the probability of an inspection relative to a past finding of compliance. 
                                                      
2 For an overview of this literature, see Cohen (2000).   3
This contribution focuses on an alternative explanation for the use of warnings as an 
enforcement instrument. If measurement errors are present or if emissions are stochastic, 
some compliant firms are unjustly sanctioned. In this instance warnings can provide a 
buffer and reduce the welfare cost of falsely accused firms. Bose (1995) has already 
shown that regulatory errors can cause the optimal penalty to be non-maximal. Looking at 
only one enforcement instrument, he has optimised the level of the fine, which is 
independent of the seriousness of violation. Similarly, Chu et al. (2000) argue that optimal 
sanctions are mild for first time offenders but severe for repeat offenders if erroneous 
conviction of innocent offenders is possible. Also Polinsky and Shavell (2000) state that 
‘introducing the possibility of mistakes may increase the desirability of lowering the fine 
because, due to type II errors’ (i.e. mistakenly punishing compliant individuals), 
‘individuals who do not violate the law are subject to the risk of having to pay a fine’. 
The model proposed here allows for a fine proportional to the size of the violation, but 
does not attempt to optimise the penalty. I show that informal, non-monetary sanctions 
should be considered as a complement to formal, monetary sanctions. In the presence of 
regulatory or managerial errors, the use of warnings can increase welfare.   
 
2. Assumptions 
The model considers two periods, in each of which firms face an emission standard e . 
Firms are inspected with an exogenously given probability  1 p . If a firm was previously 
caught violating the emission standard, it will be more frequently inspected,  21 p p > . This 
exogenous increase in inspections after a firm was caught violating is consistent with the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Harrington (1988) shows theoretically that state-
dependent enforcement, e.g. targeting firms on their compliance history, can greatly   4
improve deterrence given a fixed regulatory budget. Studying actual inspection practices, 
for example, Gray and Deily (1996) found this effect for the US steel industry, Stafford 
(2002) for the US hazardous waste regulations, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) for the 
Canadian pulp and paper industry and Rousseau (2005) for the Flemish textile industry.  
In this model, measured emissions during inspections equal:  







e e with probability q




This formulation implies that there is uncertainty with respect to the discharge level that is 
actually measured. This uncertainty is represented by the parameter  0 γ > . This can imply 
that there are asymmetric, type II measurement errors
3 present. The measuring equipment 
used by the inspection agency or the analysis of samples is such that with probability 
[[ 1
2 0; q∈  the measured result is higher than the actual emissions. Another explanation, 
following Nyborg and Telle (2004), is that sometimes violations occur by mistake. Even if 
the firm’s manager decides to comply with the regulation, the firm can in reality be 
violating the standard. This disparity between intended and real emissions can be caused 
by principal-agent problems within the firm or by exogenous causes such as weather 
conditions or calamities. The asymmetry in measured emissions implies that the emission 
level on which the sanction is based is uncertain. The firm will respond to this uncertainty 
by adjusting its behaviour. 
If a firm i is found in violation ()
m
i ee > , then a fine  ( )
m
ii Fe  is levied with 
' 0 i F >  and 
'' 0 i F > .  
                                                      
3 Errors of two types can occur in law enforcement. First, an individual who should be found liable might 
mistakenly not be found liable, i.e. a type I error. Second, an individual who should be found compliant 
might mistakenly be found violating, i.e. a type II error. I only consider the case where type II errors are 
present and type I errors are not. However, the results continue to hold as long as the disutility caused by 
type II errors is larger than that caused by type I errors.   5
Firms are assumed to be risk neutral and identical except for the cost parameter  i θ . Firms 
initially emit  () o ee >  units of the regulated pollutant. In order to reduce emissions by ai 
firm i incurs a cost  () ii Ce θ  with 
'' ' 0, 0, ioi CCe e a < <= −  and where  [[ 0, i θ ∈+ ∞  is a 
continuous cost parameter. Actual emissions ei  are equal to baseline emissions  o e  
subtracted by abated emissions a i. Additionally, in order to have a convex total cost 











Firms choose their actual emissions  ti e , with index t indicating the time period, in order to 
minimise the total costs TCi associated with the environmental standard: 






ti i t i i t i e
t




 ∑  (1) 
and  { } 12 , i p pp ∈ depending on the firm’s compliance history. 
The problem is solved through backward induction. First the regulatory scheme is 
discussed where fines are the only enforcement instrument available and next it is studied 
what happens if both warnings and fines can be used by the regulator.  
 
3.1 Regulatory scheme 1: Fines 
Period 2 
The problem in the second period depends on the compliance history and is quite 
straightforward. Firm i chooses the emission level  ti e  with index t indicating the period.     6
Firms minimise their environmental costs if: 
  ( ) ( ) 22 ''
m
ii ii Ce p Fe θ −=  
This is the familiar result that, for an interior solution, marginal abatement costs equal the 
marginal expected fine. As is shown in figure 1, the marginal expected fine curves can be 




, then the expected 




 and e , then they have a certain probability of being incorrectly fined and the 
marginal expected fine is  ( ) ( )
' 1 it i pq F e γ + . If the firms truly violate the emission 
standard,  ti ee > , then the marginal expected fine equals 
() () () ( )
'' 11 it i i t i p qF e p q F e γ ++ − . 
 
 
Figure 1: Abatement decision in period 2 with fines (scheme 1) 
Due to the three different regions in the marginal expected fine curves, firms can be 
divided into three groups with similar behaviour depending on their cost parameter. The 
eo 
MC ( b θ )  € 
marg. exp. fine () 2 p  
marg. exp. fine () 1 p  
MC ( a θ ) 
MC ( b θ ) 
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parameters 
a
i e  and  a θ  are subsequently defined, where 
+ denotes the right hand derivative 
in the point under consideration: 




Cp q F e θ
γ
+ 
−=  + 
 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 '' 1
aa
ii i Ce p q Fe θ γ −= +  
and 
b
i e  and  b θ  are defined by: 
  () () ( ) () ( ) 1 '1 '' 1 bCe p q Fe q Fe θ γ
+  −= − + +   
  () () ( ) () ( ) 1 '1 ' ' 1
bb b
ii i i Ce p q Fe q Fe θ γ  −= − + +   
Analogously,  ,,a n d
ab
abi i ee θθ   are defined with  2 p  instead of  1 p . This is also illustrated 
in figure 1, where  o e  are the baseline emissions if the firms do not invest in abatement 
technology. For the firm with cost parameter  ( ) ab θ θ  its marginal abatement cost MC of 





 exactly equals the marginal expected fine. 
If the firm was not convicted in the first period, its emissions  2i e  in period 2 are 
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  <≤ =  
<=
 (2) 
Low cost firms () ia θ θ ≤  overcomply with the emission standard. Medium cost firms 
() aib θ θθ <≤  also comply but are sometimes incorrectly accused of violating the 
emission standard if measurement errors are present. Alternatively, these medium cost   8
firms intend to comply but, due to managerial errors, they accidentally exceed the standard 
with probability q. High cost firms ( ) ib θ θ >  never comply. 
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Since  aa θ θ <   and  bb θ θ <  , all firms lower their emissions and more firms will comply if 
they have a past record of non-compliance because they will be inspected more frequently. 
This is the classical result found by Becker (1968); that an increase in expected penalty 
will reduce the level of crime. 
 
Period 1 
In the first period firms choose their emissions  1i e  so as to minimise their total 
environmental costs over the two periods: 
  () ( ) () ( ) { }
1
11 1 2 2 min
i
mm
ii i ii i e Ce p Fe Ce p Fe θδ θ   ++ +    (4) 
with  1 δ ≤  the discount rate. 
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  <≤ =  
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This expression is equivalent to the second period decision for a firm without a non-
compliance record (see expression (2)). This myopic behaviour is only true for values of q   9
that fulfil several conditions with the following general form (with 
*
12 eee ≤≤ and 
* e  is 
the optimum of TC(ei) for a given  i θ ): 
  ( ) ()
() () ()
( ) ( ) ( ) ()
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The second term is always greater than or equal to one given our assumption on the 
second derivatives of F and C, i.e. 
'' '' 0 i Cp F + ≥ . And, since q must be smaller than one, 
these conditions always hold. The main reason behind this myopic behaviour is the fact 
that abatement efforts are only valid for one period and thus abatement costs return every 
period. The types of abatement costs under consideration are operating and maintenance 
costs that are necessary to minimise the emissions associated with the production process. 
The firms’ emission behaviour over the two periods can be described as (with [ ] E  the 
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Depending on their cost parameter firms can be grouped into five categories. The first 
group, lowest cost firms, always overcomplies while the last category, highest cost firms, 
always violates the environmental regulation.   10
3.2 Regulatory scheme 2: Fines and warnings 
The regulator can now use warnings as well as fines in order to enforce the emission 
standard. A warning is a non-monetary sanction, which notifies the firm about a detected 
(small) violation and gives the manager the opportunity to remediate the situation. For this 
reason, a warning is a problem-solving rather than a penalising enforcement instrument. In 
this model a warning
4 is issued when the firm’s measured emissions 
m
i e  lay between e  
and  () 1 e γ + , and the firm was not previously given a warning or a fine. A fine  ()
m
i Fe  is 
directly applied for large detected violations,  ( ) 1
m
i ee γ >+ , or for small violations of 
previously sanctioned firms,  ( ) 1
m
i ee e γ <≤ +. If a firm was found in violation in the first 
period and a fine was levied or a warning was sent, it will face the higher probability of 
inspection in the second period,  21 p p > . As Eckert (2004) and Rousseau (2005) show 




In the second period the abatement decision of the firm depends on its compliance history. 
The parameters  ,,a n d ii ee
α β
αβ θθ  are defined in analogy to  , , and
ab
abi i ee θθ  (see figure 
2). Firstly, I consider the decision process when the firm was not previously found in 
violation of the emission standard,  1
m
i ee ≤ . This gives: 
                                                      
4 If the government knows the size of the measurement error ( ) γ , it might also decide to fine only firms 
with emissions larger than  () 1 e γ + , cf. speeding violations. However, such a strategy would not allow the 
agency to target inspections using previous warnings and firms will have less incentives to reduce emission 
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  <≤ = +  
<=
 (5) 
If the firm has low abatement costs,  i α θ θ ≤ , then it complies exactly with the emission 
standard in the second period. Medium cost firms,  i α β θ θθ < ≤ , choose their emission 
levels such that they have a lower probability ( ) 11 p qp <  to incur a fine than high cost 
firms with  i β θ θ < . Remark that  a α θ θ >  and  b β θ θ > . 
 
Figure 2: Abatement decision in period 2 with fines and warnings (scheme 2) 
Secondly, I investigate what happens if the firm was found in violation in the first period, 
1
m
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e   ( ) 1 e γ +    12
Firms with a non-compliance record make the same emission decision in the second 
period irrespective whether they face fines or fines and warnings combined. After all, if 
the firm exceeded the emission limit in the first period, the environmental inspection 
agency will not use warnings anymore, not even for small abuses. Since, in the case of 
managerial errors the firm was given the opportunity to correct the situation, all detected 
violations in the second period are regarded as intentional and therefore punished by a 
fine. In the case of independent measurement errors, the probability that the firm’s 
emissions are twice incorrectly measured above the emissions standard is positive but 
small since  [ [ 1
2 0; q∈ . 
 
Period 1 
In the first period firms again choose their emissions in order to minimise the total costs 
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This is equivalent to the second period decision if the firm was not previously fined.  
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Else if  and ab α β θ θθ θ >>  , the resulting emissions are calculated in a similar way. The 
illustration in section 4.3 is an example with  and ab α β θ θθ θ >>  . The ranking of these 
cost parameters depends on the functional specification of the abatement costs and 
expected fine. It is impossible to have  and ab α β θ θθ θ ><  or and ab α β θ θθ θ <>  . 
 
4. Results when firms’ intended and measured emissions coincide 
In order to compare the impact of both regulatory schemes, it is first necessary to define 
what happens if there is no uncertainty with respect to the measured emissions and 
measurements carried out by the inspection agency will correctly determine the firm’s 
emissions. Managers know that, if they choose to exceed the emission standard and they 
are inspected, the violation will be detected with certainty. Likewise, managers can also be 
certain that, if they decide to comply with the regulation, they will not accidentally be 
found disobeying. 
The firm’s abatement decisions in the second period, if they are not fined in the first 
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If the firm was previously found to exceed the emissions standard, its emission decision in 
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Figure 3: Abatement decision in period 2 with fines and under certainty 
The firm’s decision in the first period is equivalent to that in the second period if the firm 
was previously not fined (see equation (7)). This myopic behaviour occurs since firms 
prefer to incur the higher cost with a probability,  1 i pq≤ , in the second period rather than 
with certainty in the first period. The parameters 
** * * ,,a n d ii ee θθ    are defined in a similar 
way as before (see figure 3). Firms will obey the rules and emit exactly e  if their 
abatement costs are sufficiently low. Otherwise they will violate the emission standard and 
the seriousness of the infraction depends on the level of their emission reduction costs. 
 
5. Comparison 
This section compares the emission decisions made under the different regulatory 
schemes, both when the results of the agency’s emission measurements are certain and 
€ 
ei  eo  e  
MC( )
* θ  
MC ( )
* θ  
marg. exp. fine () 2 p  
marg. exp. fine () 1 p    15
uncertain. Figure 4 illustrates that warnings alleviate the overdeterrence caused by the 
uncertainty with respect to the measured emissions. In the first (figure 4) and second 
period a similar picture emerges. If the emission levels on which the monetary sanction is 
based are uncertain, or equivalently if the expected value of the measured emissions is 
systematically higher than the intended or real emissions, warnings can provide a buffer to 
give firms time to return to compliance without having to pay monetary penalties. The use 
of non-monetary sanctions, such as warnings, thus counteracts the distortions caused by 
false positives or type II-errors as well as the overdeterrence caused by the uncertain 
measured emissions. It does, however, create some medium-cost firms, that are compliant 
under a fine system, to exceed the emissions standard since they will be underdeterred. 
 
Figure 4: Emission levels with certain and uncertain measured emissions (period 1) 
 
5. Illustration 
In order to illustrate the impact of the different regulatory schemes, I specify the various 
parameters and functions for CO2 regulation and calculate the associated welfare effects. 
o e  
() 1 e γ +  
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The associated emission decisions for both regulatory schemes are described in tables 1 
and 2. 
i θ ∈ Period  1:  1i e  Period  2:  [ ] 2i Ee  












  ( )( ) 1 0.22 0.22 90.91
a
i e −+  
] ] 0.0242,0.0403 100  ( )( ) 1 0.22 100 0.22 90.91 −+  
] ] 0.0403,0.0484 100  ()
200







−+  + 
 












  ( )( ) 1 0.1 0.1 100
b
i e −+  
] ] 0.2084,0.25  
b
i e   ()
200









−+  ++ 
Table 1: Regulatory scheme 1: Fines 
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i θ ∈ Period  1:  1i e  Period  2:  [ ] 2i Ee  












  ( )( ) 1 0.1 0.1 90.91 i e
α −+  
] ] 0.0296,0.0403 110  ( )( ) 1 0.1 110 0.1 90.91 −+  
] ] 0.0403,0.0484 110  ()
200
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  ( )( ) 1 0.1 0.1 100 i e
β −+  
] ] 0.2084,0.25   i e
β   ()
200









−+  ++ 
Table 2: Regulatory scheme 2: Warnings plus fines 
 
Figure 5 compares the resulting emissions of these two enforcement options with the 
emissions obtained under certainty in the first and second period. Under a fine scheme, 
low cost firms,  0.0202 i θ ≤ , are overdeterred and will overcomply with the emission 
standard. Medium cost firms, 0.0202 0.1042 i θ < ≤ , will exactly comply, while high cost 
firms, 0.1042 i θ > , will violate the environmental regulation. Under the regulatory scheme 
which combines warnings with fines, low cost firms,  0.0242 i θ ≤ , comply while medium 
and high cost firms exceed the standard. In order to compare both schemes, the 
overdeterrence of the low cost firms on the one hand must be weighted with the 
underdeterrence of the medium cost firms on the other hand and it is also necessary to 
value the social costs associated with false convictions. 
In the second period more firms comply under both regulatory schemes. After all, firms 
that were found to be non-compliant in the first period will be inspected with a higher 
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Figure 5: Comparison with the emissions obtained under certainty (period 1 and period 2) 
In order to make a clear comparison, social welfare is calculated under each scenario with 
arbitrary parameter values. For illustrative purposes, the discount rate  is 0.9 δ , fines are 
costless transfers, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) for one tonne reduction in CO2 is 5 euro, 
the cost of an inspection is negligible and the cost parameter  i θ  is discretely uniformly 
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with  0 Λ≥  the social cost of fining innocent firms. 
Social welfare with  0 Λ=  when only fines are used as a regulatory instrument and 
uncertainty is present, equals 8693 euro. When also warnings are allowed, social welfare 
is increased to 9350 euro, i.e. an increase of 7.6%. The benchmark with fines under   19
certainty leads to a social welfare level of 11790 euro. So, even if falsely levied fines do 
not reduce social welfare, social welfare under a warning-fine regime will be higher than 
social welfare under a fine regime since such a regime reduces the overdeterrence effect 
and saves on abatement expenditures. In the, more realistic, case where prosecuting 
innocent firms has a social cost, the difference in social welfare will be even more 
striking. This strong result depends on functional specifications of the abatement and fine 
functions as well as on the estimate of the willingness-to-pay for environmental 
improvement. Under other specifications the result might not be as clear but, if the social 
cost of falsely fining firms is high enough, then it will always pay off to use warnings as a 
complement to fines.  
In this illustrative exercise, for  2 5.67euro/tonneCO reduced WTP ≥  and  0 Λ= , social 
welfare of the fine scheme will always exceed that of the warning-fine scheme. If, for 
example, the WTP equals 10 euro per tonne CO2 reduced, then the social cost Λ of 
incorrect fining will need to be larger than 2879 euro per incident to make warnings a 
socially beneficial enforcement instrument. Garcia-Quijano et al. (2005) mention that the 
expected world market price for tradable CO2 permits is at present estimated between 5 
and 20 euro per tonne CO2. Furthermore, the closing prices of the European CO2 emission 
trading market in November 2005 ranged between 21 and 23 Euro per tonne CO2. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In my opinion the prevalent role of warnings in the daily policy of an inspection agency 
can be explained as a corrective measure when there is an imperfect match between the 
firm’s emission decision and the agency’s measured emissions. Introducing the use of 
warnings as a non-monetary enforcement instrument can thus increase social welfare   20
when the results of emission measurements are uncertain. This uncertainty implies that 
abatement decisions taken by the firm’s manager are not perfectly reflected in the level of 
emissions which could be measured by the inspection agency. Measured emissions can be 
biased upwards if, for example, the agency’s measuring equipment does not work 
perfectly or if managers’ decisions are poorly implemented by the workforce. In such a 
situation, warnings can, firstly, be used as a problem-solving device and as an alert to 
managers that communication within the company or employees’ incentives might be 
improved. A warning-fine system allows firms to correct small accidental discharges or to 
investigate principal-agent relationships without monetary consequences. Even though it 
creates some underdeterrence of medium cost firms, such a system reduces the 
overdeterrence of low cost firms caused by the difference between intended and measured 
emissions. Secondly, warnings reduce the number of incorrect prosecutions in the case of 
measurement errors, which is also welfare enhancing. 
The results of this study show theoretically that it is important to consider informal as well 
as formal enforcement instruments. Both types of instruments can not only be used as 
substitutes but also, and more importantly, as complements. 
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